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  In October 2008, Prime Minister Harper of Canada and President Nicholas Sarkozy of 
France confirmed during the Canada-EU Summit that Canada and the EU would start to explore 
the possibility of a FTA. A few months later (May 2009) the launch of the negotiations for a 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) was announced. The concept of a FTA 
between Canada and the EU is not new but for many years the EU has rejected any initiative put 
forward by Canada to significantly deepen economic relations; leaving Canada as one of only 
eight countries without any form of preferential trade agreement with the EU. For example, the 
negotiations on a Trade and Investment Enhancement Agreement were looking very promising, 
but in 2006 the two parties jointly decided to pause the negotiations and no results have been 
forthcoming. This is troubling because, in 1976, Canada was the first industrialized non-
European country that concluded a bilateral Framework Agreement for Commercial and 
Economic Cooperation with the EU. However, little has resulted from this cooperation 
agreement. 
  
  In October 2008, Canada and the EU released a joint study Assessing the Costs and 
Benefits of a Closer EU-Canada Economic Partnership which outlines the economic benefits 
that could arise from closer economic integration, namely that GDP in EU would increase by 
0.08 percent and in Canada by 0.77 percent. This study is the source of the $12 billion estimated 
benefit to Canada that is often mentioned in news reports. Canada and the EU have agreed that 
the major areas for negotiation are: trade in goods and services, investment, government 
procurement, regulatory cooperation, intellectual property, temporary entry of business persons, 
competition policy, labour and environment.  The attempt to create closer economic cooperation 
between Canada and the EU has been given a boost by three factors: 1) the glacial pace of the 
Doha Development Agenda at the WTO; 2) a fundamental shift in economic power towards 
Asia; and 3) Canada’s status as an important energy producer with a stable democratic 
government.  For Canada, a bilateral agreement with the EU would give it better access to 500 
million consumers and help it to attract additional investment, technology and skilled workers 
from Europe.  Some of the predictable sensitive issues that will challenge the CETA negotiations 
are agriculture, ship building, alcoholic beverages, trade remedies, health and safety standards, 
environmental regulations, intellectual property and government procurement.  The market 
access negotiations in agriculture will also have to deal with a bewildering set of non-tariff 
barriers including packaging, labeling, certification (technical barriers to trade (TBT)) and health 
and safety standards (sanitary and phytosanitary standards (SPS)).  
 
Canada and EU Trade and Investment 
 
  The economic relationship between Canada and the EU is characterized by strong two-
way trade and investment. The EU represents Canada’s second-largest trading partner, after the 
US, with exports to the EU valued at $52.2 billion and imports from the EU of $62.4 billion in 
2008. However, Canada is only the EU’s eleventh largest trading partner. The EU is the second 
largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Canada ($133.1 billion in 2008) and Canada 
is the fourth largest source of FDI in the EU (21.4 percent of Canadian FDI abroad in 2007).  
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There is a considerable overlap in the product groups that the two parties trade with each 
other. The largest percentage of trade between the two countries is machinery and transport 
equipment. More than 60 percent of EU imports from Canada are manufactured products such as 
machinery, transport equipment and chemicals. Canada’s main imports are transport equipment, 
crude materials and manufactured goods. Canada runs trade deficits with the EU in most 
industries, including agricultural products.  
 
Agricultural products represent a major import/export sector for Canada (6% of exports, 
2.5% of imports). A slight drop in agricultural exports to the EU in 2005 was followed by a 
continuous increase reaching $2.3 billion in 2008. Canadian agricultural exports to the EU are 
mainly bulk commodities like grain and oilseeds. Canada’s agricultural imports from the EU 
reached $3.7 billion in 2008. The main agricultural imports from the EU are processed foods and 
alcoholic beverages. The EU has been a significant net agricultural exporter to Canada for many 
years.  
 
Barriers to Agricultural Trade 
 
  Canada and the EU have a long history of supporting their agricultural sectors with 
government programs and policies and of protecting the sector from imports through tariffs and 
non-tariff barriers. Less clear is the role that standards and a variety of sanitary, phyto-sanitary 
and technical regulations play in providing protection to the sector.   
 
In terms of tariffs, although both the EU and Canada have low most-favoured-nation 
(MFN) average tariffs on industrial goods (3.7 percent for Canada and 3.9 percent for the EU), 
food and agricultural products still face high tariffs. Overall, Canadian tariffs on imports from 
the EU have decreased on a trade weighted basis, but access to Canadian supply managed 
products such as dairy, eggs, turkey and chicken is highly restricted. Although EU tariffs on 
agricultural products were lowered during the Uruguay Round they are still high. In fact, 
agriculture is the only major product group that has tariffs in excess of 35 percent (54 percent for 
dairy products). The smaller fish, shrimp and sea food sector (where Canada is a significant 
exporter) is also heavily restricted by high tariffs and TRQs. 
 
According to the OECD (2010) support and protection for the agricultural sector in 
Canada and the EU is near the OECD average of 21 percent of the value of farm output; 17 
percent in Canada and 23 percent in the EU.  However, the level of spending in the EU 
(US$120.8 billion) dwarfs Canada’s (US$7.8 billion).  Despite recent reforms a large percentage 
of the producer support is based on the level of output – it is coupled to annual production and/or 
prices. 
 
  Regulations have long been recognized for their potential to inhibit, restrict or eliminate 
trade in agriculture and food products in response to protectionist motivated lobbying of 
politicians. Traditionally, the lobbying for this form of protection has come from producers in 
import markets seeking relief from foreign competitors. In more recent times, the set of 
individuals and groups seeking regulatory trade barriers, in the EU, has expanded to include 
consumers and environmentalists. Thus, the task of those negotiating trade agreements is to put 3 
 
in place systems that can accommodate legitimate regulatory barriers while restricting the use of 
such barriers for nefarious purposes – but this is not an easy task. 
 
Differing product standards between countries can also act as barriers to trade. For 
example, the EU requires that to be accepted as organic products in its markets, exporters must 
have a national standard for organic products and that standard must be acceptable to the EU – it 
does not mean that the standard must be harmonized with the EU standard. Until recently, 
Canada had no national organic standard and faced exclusion from the EU market. Canada did 
develop a national organic standard – but at a considerable cost. As trade in agrifood products is 
comprised of a rising proportion of processed foods, standards become increasingly important in 
the governance of trade. 
 
Realistic Expectations for Agriculture 
 
  In accessing the gains, in agriculture, from trade liberalization with the EU there are two 
potential drivers: 1) gains from less competition in third country markets; and 2) gains from 
increased bilateral trade resulting from lower tariffs and from removing regulatory barriers to 
trade.   
 
  Both the EU and Canada have sectors with significant barriers to market access that 
negatively impact the exports of the other party in the bilateral discussions. Barriers to market 
access are not homogeneous with regard to the motivation for their imposition. Some tariff 
impediments faced by Canadian products attempting to enter the EU market are required to 
maintain the integrity of the remaining EU export subsidies – export subsidies raise producer 
prices in the importing country above world market prices and, thus, to prevent consumers from 
taking advantage of lower world prices, barriers to market access are required. Thus, lowering 
barriers to market access in these situations will first require that the question of export subsidies 
be effectively dealt with multilaterally at the WTO.  There are, however, some areas where 
increased market access might be achieved even in the case of export-subsidy motivated tariffs. 
For example, the EU import tariff on beef is in the 50 percent range. One product that is 
negatively impacted by this tariff is Canadian bison meat. This is because the EU has no separate 
tariff line for bison – bison, presumably due to its genetic closeness to beef, is classified as beef 
for EU tariff purposes. This very large tariff has hindered the development of the market for 
Canadian bison in the EU. Canada could seek agreement that the EU would create a new tariff 
line for bison meat. After all, there is no export subsidy regime for bison in the EU; in fact there 
is no bison industry. With no protectionist vested interests in the EU, this may be an area where 
Canada might obtain concessions relatively easily. While the bison industry is not large, it is one 
that Canadian governments have been trying to foster as part of their diversification efforts in 
western Canada. A significant opening of the EU market could give a considerable boost to the 
industry. There may be other niche market products that are caught in inappropriate tariff or 
regulatory regimes that are, as yet, not of sufficient importance to garner any official action from 
EU bureaucrats. Creating a fast track mechanism to handle tariff anomalies, regulatory vacuums 
and bureaucratic inertia within the Canada-EU agreement might yield considerable benefits for 
future industries – where vested interests do not (yet) exist in the EU. 
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While the 50 percent tariff on beef is sufficient to exclude Canadian beef from the EU 
market, beef represents a clear example of layered barriers to trade. Even if the high EU tariff on 
beef could be removed, movements of beef into the EU market would still be prohibited. This is 
because of the EU ban on imports of beef produced using growth hormones – note it was only a 
few beef products (largely offal), whose tariff lines were not subject to the high beef tariffs, that 
were affected by the hormone-based ban. Thus, removing one layer of market access restriction 
may lead to another binding constraint. 
 
Beef can be produced without the use of hormones in Canada. Thus, it may be possible to 
profitably supply hormone free beef to the EU. The large EU tariff on beef, however, has 
prohibited the development of this form of beef production in Canada. The EU does, however, 
allow limited quantities of beef to be imported without the tariff being applied. This limited 
access in known as the Hilton Quota. The US recently gained an expansion in its Hilton Quota as 
a result of bilateral negotiations with the EU. As part of the CETA, Canada could negotiate an 
increase in its allotment of Hilton quota.  The increase would have to be of sufficient size to 
justify the establishment of hormone-free beef production in Canada and the co-requisite of a 
segregated supply chain for hormone-free beef. If this degree of increase in market access could 
be secured in the negotiations it would be an important facet of the agreement.  
 
The case of beef produced using hormones is only the tip of the iceberg for a significant 
issue pertaining to market access to the EU. This is the problem the EU has in dealing with 
consumers, environmentalists and others requesting barriers to market access. The WTO’s trade 
architecture only recognizes the right of governments to respond to producers asking for 
protection. In recent years, however, consumers, environmentalists and others have been asking 
– sometimes forcefully demanding – that the EU Commission impose trade barriers on a variety 
of products. Often, these products can originate in Canada. For example, some consumers in the 
EU have been advocating an import ban on seal pelts from Canada and have been sufficiently 
persuasive to have the European Parliament legislate a limit on imports. As discussed above, 
consumers in the EU were successful in having imports of beef produced using growth hormones 
banned – and in having the EU Commission accept retaliation rather than complying with a 
WTO disputes Panel ruling. The latter, while within the EU’s rights under the WTO, is an 
unprecedented action.  
 
The EU will also be looking for market access opportunities in Canada.  The 
opportunities for EU agriculture and food exporters probably lie where Canadian trade barriers 
are the highest – and where Canadian opposition to trade liberalization is the most vociferous – 
those areas where supply management is the Canadian domestic policy. Access to poultry 
markets is unlikely to be a major area of interest for the EU – although there might be some 
niches where specialty products could benefit from lower barriers to access. Dairy products are 
where the EU would like to gain better market access – in particular specialty cheeses. The EU 
has long chafed under high tariffs and other market access restrictions for their differentiated 
cheeses. Resistance to increasing market access is, however, strident among Canadian dairy 
producers. They have successfully defended supply management in other bilateral negotiations 
like the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (CUSTA) and the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) as well as during the Uruguay Round and the current Doha Round.  This 
does not mean, however, that some increase in the minimum access commitments for some EU 5 
 
products could not be negotiated. This might require some modest adjustments in the supply 
managed sectors. 
 
The EU also wants better market access for its wines. The main barrier, however, is the 
purchasing/sales practices of monopsonistic/monopolistic provincial government liquor boards in 
some Canadian provinces. Of course, this enters the realm of constitutional division of powers in 
Canada – although it was stick handled in the CUSTA. 
 
We believe there is the making of a grand bargain in agriculture – don’t you push for 
broad-based market access into the EU and we won’t push for broad-based market access in 
Canada. There does not seem to be compelling pressure from outside the sector in either country 
to trade off market access in agriculture to obtain something in services or manufacturing – so 
the grand bargain is likely to stay within agriculture and any gains in market access are likely 
product specific and relatively limited. 
  
  Another area where the EU and perhaps Canada will be looking for concessions is 
represented by Geographical Indications (GIs). GIs are a form of intellectual property. GIs 
require protection from the state because they apply to goods where value is derived from 
credence attributes. Credence attributes are those that consumers cannot identify even after the 
product is consumed. Unlike search attributes that can be identified by consumers prior to 
purchase (e.g. the colour of a shirt) and experience attributes that can be identified through 
consumption (e.g. the tenderness of a lamb chop), credence attributes cannot be directly 
discerned by the consumer (e.g. whether the fortified red wine they just consumed was produced 
in Porto Portugal). 
 
As agricultural policy has become more oriented toward GIs, the EU has become 
increasingly interested in garnering additional protection for their GIs in foreign markets. If 
foreign governments can be convinced to enforce GIs granted in the EU then monopoly rents 
accruing to the rights holders should increase, thus assisting in raising the incomes of agricultural 
producers (and/or others) in the EU and contributing to a range of rural policy objectives. There 
are three contentious international issues pertaining to GIs: 1) a major global split in the 
mechanism used to protect this particular form of intellectual property; 2) the treatment of some 
products that have been granted GI status in the EU as generic terms in some other countries – 
meaning that they are considered common terms and not identified with production being 
undertaken in a particular geographic local (e.g. Feta cheese in Canada); and 3) garnering foreign 
protection for less well known or new EU GI designations. The EU position on GIs in the 
negotiations has not been made public. One might, however, gain some insights regarding what 
GIs they might want Canada to protect from other EU requests pertaining to GIs. At the WTO 
Cancun Summit in 2003, the EU brought forth a list of GIs for which it sought protection.  At 
that time it was suggested that the EU was likely to demand that list, comprising 40 products, be 
accepted by WTO members as non-generic, protected terms as part of the market access package 
for the Doha Round (USDA, 2003). If most of the EU GIs for wine and spirits were recognized 
by Canada in the Canada-EU Wine and Spirits Agreement, the major contentious issue for 
CETA negotiations is represented by non-wine and spirits (mostly cheeses and cured meat) that 






Given the existing set of agricultural policy constraints that exist in both the EU and 
Canada, only limited liberalization can be expected in the agricultural sector as a result of the 
CETA. The original premise of the agreement was that agricultural issues would be largely taken 
care of multilaterally under the Doha Development Agenda. For example, the list of both 
country’s  sensitive products would have been agreed – thus, for example, Canada’s supply 
managed products would have been removed from the table in the Canada-EU negotiations. In a 
similar fashion, the issue of EU export subsidies would have been resolved. Further, there would 
have been a new regime for obligations pertaining to domestic support. With the Doha Round 
not yet (and maybe never) completed, all of these issues, in theory, come under the ambit of the 
Canada-EU negotiations – everything is on the table. 
 
While everything may be on the table it is possible to agree to disagree – to opt for 
something close to the status quo. The things that Canada really wants like secure market access 
when EU officials are faced with resistance from consumers, environmentalists and others with 
social concerns (e.g. beef produced using hormones, products using genetic modification in their 
production and animal welfare regimes) are difficult areas for EU negotiators. In Canada, areas 
where the EU may have interests such market access for speciality cheeses strike at the heart of 
Canada’s supply management policy – which has been a no go area for Canadian negotiators for 
decades. Geographical indications are also likely to entail difficult negotiations. 
 
 Thus,  despite  everything being on the table it is difficult to see where significant 
movement away from the status quo in agriculture can be negotiated. Most observers agree that 
the major areas where gains can be made in CETA are in the services sector and selected areas of 
manufacturing.  It seems unlikely that CETA will be as all encompassing as the NAFTA with 
only a few agricultural products excluded from full tariff elimination.  Still, it sends a bad signal 
if some trade liberalization is not achieved in agriculture and with a long implementation period 
no reason not to make progress.  The major gains in agriculture are likely to be in niche markets 
which taken individually are small but in aggregate could provide a boost to Canadian 
agriculture.  Most importantly, a trade agreement with the potential to open a rich market with 
500 million consumers to the wide range of products and services exported by Canada cannot 
afford to be hijacked by challenging negotiations in agriculture. 